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I. INTRODUCTION
The history of international extradition between the United States and
Mexico has not been one characterized by emphatic cooperation on either
side.' It has been plagued by reluctance and mistrust.' Both countries have
resisted attempts by the other to enforce its criminal laws extraterritorially'
This resistance is heightened when the countries are asked to surrender their
own nationals to the criminal courts of the other nation. Mexico has been
especially reluctant to comply with requests for the surrender of Mexican
nationals accused of importing narcotics into the United States.' In fact, until
March 2, 2001, no major Mexican drug trafficker had ever been extradited to
stand trial in the United States.5 For two countries that share a 2000 mile
border and a plague of cross-border crime, this has, and will continue to
present a major problem.6
A major factor that contributed to this climate of mistrust was the U.S.
attempt to circumvent the formal extradition process through the use of a
transborder abduction.' On April 2, 1990, a group of armed men apprehended
Dr. Humberto Alvarez-Machain from Guadalajara and flew him to El Paso,
Texas, where the DEA arrested him for his conduct in connection with the
J.D. 2002, University of Georgia; B.S. 1999, Vanderbilt University.
See Vicente Fox, 'Now' Trust is the Basis for Mexico-US. Cooperation, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 5, 2001, at B4.
See id.
See id.
See generally Joshua S. Spector, Extraditing Mexican Nationals in the Fight Against
International Narcotics Crime, 31 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 1007 (1998); Michael Plachta, (Non-)
Extradition of Nationals: A Neverending Story?, 13 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 77 (1999).
' See Robert J. Caldwell, End Legal Sanctuary for Drug Kingpins, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIBUNE, July 16, 2000 at GI; but see Landmark Ruling: Mexico's Highest Court Upholds
Extradition, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Jan. 24, 2001, at B8 (discussing a recent Mexican
Supreme Court ruling authorizing the extradition of Arturo Paez, a key member of the Arellano
Felix Organization, but noting that several legal formalities must be satisfied before he can
actually be extradited to the United States).
6 See Caldwell, supra note 5, at G I.
See Dea Abramschmitt, Note, Neighborly Countries; Un-Neighborly Acts: A Look at the
Extradition Relationships Among the United States, Mexico, and Canada, 4 J. TRANSNAT'L L.
& POL'Y 121, 125.
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murder of an undercover DEA agent in Mexico in 1985. The Mexican
authorities, as well as much of the international community were outraged by
the act.9 In their view, this constituted a major violation of territorial
sovereignty.'0 The Mexican authorities were further appalled when the U.S.
Supreme Court upheld the act as a constitutional method of obtaining
jurisdiction over a criminal, citing the absence of an express provision
prohibiting the use of transborder abductions in the U.S.-Mexico Extradition
Treaty." As a result, the United States' extensive efforts to curb the flow of
illegal narcotics from Mexico to the United States have been severely
hampered. 2
Also, several institutional obstacles such as widespread corruption in the
police forces and judicial processes of Mexico complicate and further impede
the chances of increased cooperation in the extradition of Mexican nationals
to the United States. 3 On the other hand, continuing corruption in Mexico's
institutions may cause members of the Mexican Executive Branch to realize
that effective domestic prosecution is not feasible, thus increasing the chances
for increased extradition of Mexican nationals.
However, recent developments in the relations between the two countries
indicate that increased cooperation in the matter is forthcoming. For example,
a recent Mexican Supreme Court decision authorized the extradition of a
lieutenant in the notorious Arellano-Felix Organization (AFO) to the United
States.' 4 This may signal an end to Mexico's longstanding policy against
extraditing Mexican narcotics traffickers to the United States. Furthermore,
the electoral victory of Vicente Fox over the PRI candidate in the country's
presidential elections has signaled a major change in the trend of non-
extradition of nationals. 5 Fox has vowed to crackdown on narcotics
See Abraham Abramovsky, ExtraterritorialAbductions: America's "Catch and Snatch"
Policy Run Amok, 31 VA. J. INT'L L. 151,168 (1991).
9 See Plachta, supra note 4, at 1084-91.
'0 See id. at 1087-88.
" See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
n See Argiro Kosmetatos, U.S.-Mexican Extradition Policy: Were the Predictions Right
About Alvarez?, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1064, 1072 (1999).
'" See Juan M. Vasquez, U.S. Bitterness Lingers in DrugAgent's Killing, L.A. TIMES, Mar.
17,1985, at Al; Mark Fineman & Sebastian Rotella, The Drug Web That Entangles Mexico: The
Nation's Deepening Crises and a New Attack on Corruption Expose the Sinister Ties Between
Cartels and Government, Investigators Say, L.A. TIMES, June 15, 1995, at Al.
See Landmark Ruling: Mexico's Highest Court Upholds Extradition, supra note 5, at B8.
IS See DEA Praises Anti-Corruption Efforts by Fox, DESERET NEWS, Apr. 20, 200 1, at A4.
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trafficking in Mexico, especially on the infamous, Tijuana-based Arellano-
Felix Organization.
6
This Note analyzes the prospects for increased cooperation by the Mexican
authorities in the extradition of Mexican nationals accused of narcotics
trafficking by the United States in light of recent events. It argues that despite
signs of willingness on behalf of Mexican officials to extradite, major
obstacles still lie in the way of making this a common practice. Part II consists
of a brief overview of international extradition. Part III discusses the relevant
provisions of the U.S.-Mexican Extradition Treaty, which has been in effect
since 1980. " Part IV outlines the process of extraditing a Mexican national to
the United States. Part V sets forth traditional arguments against international
extradition ofnationals. These arguments help explain Mexico's longstanding
policy against extraditing Mexican narcotics traffickers. Part VI sets forth
arguments in favor of extraditing nationals, and aids in the understanding of
Mexico's sudden shift in policy. Part VII discusses recent cases of extradition
from Mexico to the United States. Part VIII will discuss the factors that
constitute obstacles to the further extradition of Mexican nationals. Part IX
will focus on an analysis of the factors that may tend to increase cooperation
between the two countries. Finally, Part X will analyze the legal implications
and effects of extraditing Mexican narcotics traffickers.
II. BACKGROUND ON INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION
Extradition is defined as "the surrender by one nation to another of an
individual accused or convicted of an offense outside of its own territory, and
within the territory of the other, which, being competent to try and to punish
6 See Ken Ellingwood, Mexican President Reaffirms War on Crime Reform, L.A. TIMES,
Feb 1, 2001, at A3; see also Robert Caldwell, Still at Large: Tijuana 's Arellano Felix Drug
Cartel Defies The United States and Mexico, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Apr. 8,2001, atG1. The
Arellano-Felix cartel (AFO), led by brothers Ramon and Benjamin Arellano Felix, is responsible
for supplying more than one fifth of all the cocaine consumed in the United States. Both
brothers were indicted in the United States last May on charges ranging from drug trafficking
to money laundering. While Mexican authorities were successful in apprehending a number of
low ranking members of the organization, the brothers still defiantly retain their headquarters
and principal residences in Tijuana. Prior attempts to weaken the cartel, like the investigation
conducted in 2000 by the Mexican Attorney General's Office, have been thwarted by corruption
and lethal retribution. In that case, the mangled bodies of three Mexican drug prosecutors were
found in a ravine in Tijuana. They had been betrayed by corrupt officials of the Mexican
Attorney General's elite anti-narcotics task force. See id.
" See Extradition Treaty, U.S.-Mex., May 4, 1978, entered into force January 25, 1980, art.
1, 31 U.S.T. 5059 [hereinafter U.S. Mexico Extradition Treaty].
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him, demands surrender.""' A state's power to enforce its criminal laws within
its territory is considered to be an important part of the exercise of state
sovereignty. 9 This concept is embodied in the principle of quidquid est in
territorio est etiam de territorio, i.e., a state has supreme authority over all
individuals and property within its boundaries.2"
However, states are generally not allowed to enforce their criminal laws
outside of their territory.2' Although they can exercise criminal jurisdiction
over criminals, the problem of bringing the offender inside the territory of the
state for prosecution still exists. 2'
This is where the primary importance of international extradition becomes
apparent. Extradition provides a means of gaining custody of fugitives that
violate laws within a country and then flee across international borders.23
International extradition is a process by which the rights of an individual are
balanced against the rights of a state to enforce its criminal laws.24 It is based
on fundamental principles of international law, such as reciprocity and
comity." Comity refers to general goodwill and cooperation between states,"'
while under the principle of reciprocity, a government grants extradition in
"Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270,289 (1991).
'9 See Monica L. McHam, All's Well That Ends Well: A Pragmatic Look at International
Criminal Extradition, 20 Hous. J. INT'L L. 419, 431 (1998) (citing M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI,
INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, U.S. LAW AND PRACTICE I (3d ed. 1996)).
20 See SATYA DEVA BEDI, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 28 (1968).
21 See generally United States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212 (1981).
2 See id. at 215. This case outlines the five bases for exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction
permitted by the law of nations. The first basis, the territorial principle, determines jurisdiction
according to where the alleged offense was committed. Id. Included under this principle is the
"objective territorial" principle, which allows countries to exercise jurisdiction over acts
committed outside the territory of that country, but which are intended to produce, and actually
do produce, detrimental effects within the territory of that nation. Id. The second basis,
nationality jurisdiction, is predicated upon the nationality of the offender. Id. The third basis,
protective jurisdiction, is based on protecting the interests and integrity of the nation wishing
to exercise jurisdiction. Id. The fourth basis, universal jurisdiction, allows jurisdiction to be
exercised for certain crimes where custody of the offender is sufficient. Id. Finally, "passive
personality"jurisdiction is based on the nationality of the victim. Id. See also United States v.
Bowman, 260 U.S. 94,98 (1922) (holding that extraterritorialjurisdiction can be inferred when,
in the interests of the state, the crime would naturally be committed outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States). See also Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the
United States § 402 (1987).
2 See McHam, supra note 19, at 421 (citing M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL
EXTRADITION: U.S. LAW AND PRACTICE 1 (3d ed. 1996)).
24 See id.
2 See Kosmetatos, supra note 12, at 1068. See also BASSiOUNI, supra note 19, at 384-85.
2 See id.
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exchange for the promise of the requesting government to provide reciprocal
assistance when the requested government demands surrender of an offender.27
Customary international law imposes a duty on states to either prosecute
an offender or extradite him.2" This concept has been codified in several
multilateral conventions,2 9 which require signatory countries to take offenders
into custody for the institution of criminal or extradition proceedings.3 If the
country in which the offender is located, decides to prosecute rather than
extradite, a further obligation to use due diligence to punish the offender is
imposed upon the country by customary international law.3 The duty to
extradite or prosecute can also be found in the U.S.-Mexico Extradition
Treaty.32 It states: "If extradition is not granted pursuant to paragraph 1 of the
is article, the requested Party shall submit the case to its competent authorities
for the purpose of prosecution, provided that Party has jurisdiction over the
offense."33
However, as will be demonstrated later in this Note, domestic prosecution
is often not feasible or effective. In such situations, the importance of
extradition is greatly enhanced.
II. U.S.-MEXICAN EXTRADITION TREATY
International law generally recognizes no right of extradition apart from a
treaty in the case of common crimes.34 The U.S. Supreme Court has discussed
the importance of extradition treaties. It stated that:
27 See id.
21 See Jimmy Gurule, Terrorism, Territorial Sovereignty, and the Forcible Apprehension
of International Criminals Abroad, 17 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 457, 474 (1994). See
also BASSIOUNI, supra note 19, at 5-6.
29 See, e.g., Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hijacking),
Dec. 16, 1970,22 U.S.T. 1641, 1646 art. 7 (1971); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Act Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Sabotage), Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, 571 art. 7;
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 18, 1979, 18 I.L.M. 1456, 1460
art. 8.
30 See id.
3' See Gurule, supra note 28, at 473.
32 See U.S. Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 17, at art. 9(2).
33 id.
34 See BASSIOUNI, supra note 19, at 6 ("The duty to extradite only by virtue of a treaty...
has become the prevalent practice of the states, though reciprocity and comity still exist as legal
bases relied upon by a number of states...").
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While a government may, if agreeable to its own Constitution
and laws, voluntarily exercise the power to surrender a
fugitive from justice to the country from which he has fled,
and it has been said that it is under a moral obligation to do
so ... the legal right to the demanding country exists only
when created by treaty.35
On May 4, 1978, Mexico and the United States entered into an extradition
treaty, which went into effect on January 25, 1980.36
The treaty uses the list method for defining extraditable offenses.
According to this method, thirty-one extraditable offenses are listed in the
Appendix." If an offense falls into any of the listed categories and is
punishable under the federal laws of both countries by a deprivation of liberty
of at least one year, it is considered an extraditable offense.3" The offense of
narcotics trafficking is specifically listed in the appendix of the Treaty. 9 The
requirement that an offense be punishable in both countries is known as double
criminality and is a common requirement in bilateral extradition treaties.
40
However, this list is not exhaustive. A treaty country is also obligated to
extradite or prosecute if the offense involves willful acts that are punishable
under the federal laws of both countries by a deprivation of liberty of no less
than one year.4'
Attempts and conspiracies to commit an offense, as well as participation in
the commission of an offense (complicity) are also specifically included in the
treaty.42
The treaty further provides for extradition for offenses committed outside
of the requesting state only if the person sought is a national of the requesting
state,43 or if the laws of the requested state provide for punishment of the same
offense under similar circumstances."
3' Factor v. Laubenhiemer, 290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933).
36 See U.S. Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 17.
17 See id. at art. 2(1).
38 See id. at art. 2(1).
39 See id. at app. (14).
40 See BASSIOUN, supra note 19, at 391.
4' See U.S. Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 17, at art. 2(3).
42 See id. at art. 2(4)(a). These provisions are especially helpful in the fight against narcotics
trafficking because, in the absence of these provisions, many of the cartel kingpins would be far
enough removed from the actual trafficking to avoid extradition to the United States.
41 See id. at art. 1 (2)(b).
- See id. at art. 1(2)(a).
[Vol. 30:331
2002] EXTRADITION OF MEXICAN NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS 337
Article 3 of the treaty imposes an important limitation on the extradition of
offenders. Extradition is limited to cases where there exists sufficient
evidence, under the laws of the requested state, for trial of the offender had the
offense been committed in the requested state.45 In the situation where the
person sought has already been convicted by the requesting state, the treaty
requires sufficient evidence to prove that the person sought is the same person
convicted by the requesting state.4
Article 5 contains the political offense exception clause.47 The Mexican
Constitution specifically prohibits negotiation of extradition treaties that allow
for extradition for offenses that are political or military in nature.48 Also
included in Article 5 are certain exceptions to the political offense exception.
Excluded from the category are (a) murder or other willful crimes against the
life or physical integrity of a Head of State or Head of Government, or their
families, and (b) offenses which a treaty country is obligated to prosecute
under a multilateral agreement.49
Article 6 addresses the issue of double jeopardy.50 Under this provision,
extradition is not allowed where the requested person has been prosecuted,
tried and convicted or acquitted in the requested state for the offense for which
extradition is requested."' This type of provision is also common to almost all
international extradition treaties.5 2 It prevents different countries from
prosecuting an offender more than once for the same crime. 3 Although this
principle is embodied in international law, many extradition treaties contain
a similar clause because the principle is often circumvented through applica-
tion of the dual sovereign rule. 4 This rule allows for subsequent prosecution
of an offender if the earlier conviction was obtained by a different sovereign
from the one attempting to prosecute.55
Article 8 of the treaty provides for cases where the requesting state imposes
the death penalty for the offense for which extradition is requested, and where
4S See id. at art. 3.
46 See id.
41 See U.S. Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 17, at art. 5.
48 See MEX. CONST. art. 15, reprinted in JOSEPH WHELESS, I COMPENDIUM OF THE LAWS OF
MEXICO 5 (1910).
4 See U.S. Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 17, at art. 5(2)(a)-(b).
so See id. at art. 6.
"' See id. at art. 6.
52 See BASSIOUNI, supra note 19, at 599, n.332.
s See id. at 598.
4 See id. at 598-99 (referring to the rule as the "doctrine of separate sovereignties.").
s See id.
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the laws of the requested state do not provide for the death penalty. 6 In this
situation, extradition may be refused unless the requesting state provides
assurances that the death penalty will not be imposed or if imposed, will not
be executed.57 This provision is important in the present context because
Mexican law does not provide for the death penalty. 8
The extradition of nationals is addressed in Article 9. Under these
provisions, neither country is required to extradite its own nationals.59
However, the executive authority of the requested state may extradite a
national in its discretion.60
The Article takes into account the Mexican law prohibiting
the extradition of its nationals but permitting their prosecution
in Mexico for offenses committed abroad. Mexican law, like
the laws of most countries in Latin America and countries
following the civil law system, prevents the extradition of
nationals, except in 'extraordinary circumstances.'
61
This stipulation has proved to be a major impediment to anti-narcotics
efforts, and a source of friction between the U.S. and Mexico for many years.62
In fact, until recently, Mexico had rarely considered circumstances surround-
ing an extradition request to be exceptional or extraordinary, and thus, there
have been relatively few occasions where a request for extradition of a
Mexican national has been granted.
IV. PROCESS OF EXTRADITION FROM MEXICO TO THE UNITED STATES
Every request for extradition must be approved by the U.S. Department of
Justice.6 The State Department is responsible for requesting the extradition
of foreigners whom the United States wishes to prosecute." This applies to
6 See U.S. Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 17, at art. 8.
57 See id.
s5 See Fugitive could escape death if he makes it to Mexico, available at http://www.cnn.
cominUS/9812/02/death.row.escape.02 (Dec. 2, 1998).
'9 See id. at art. 9.
60 See id.
6' Bruce Zagaris & Julia Padierna Peralta, Mexico-United States Extradition and
Alternatives: From Fugitive Slaves to Drug Traffickers-150 Years and Beyond the Rio
Grande's Winding Courses, 12 AM. U. J. INT'L & POL'Y 519, 581 (1997).
62 See generally Spector, supra note 4.
See Zagaris & Peralta, supra note 61, at 551.
See id.
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those offenders who have only been charged with a crime and not yet
convicted, as well as to fugitives who have already been convicted in the
United States and who have fled since their conviction.65
In order to initiate extradition of a fugitive located in Mexico, U.S.
officials must submit a formal request to the Mexican Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.' A certified copy of the arrest warrant, along with evidence showing
that apprehension of the offender is appropriate and justified according to the
laws of the requested state, must be submitted with the request.67 If the
requested individual has already been convicted, a certified copy of the
conviction of the individual is necessary, and must accompany the request."
Next, a determination that the requirements of the U.S.-Mexico Extradition
Treaty, and the requirements under Mexican law are met is required. If
satisfied, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs then forwards the materials to the
Mexican Attorney General.69 If the evidence provided is determined to be
sufficient to show probable cause"0 by a Mexican districtjudge assigned to the
case,7 the requested offender is arrested and brought before the judge for an
extradition hearing.72
At the extradition hearing, the accused offender may set forth two
arguments. First, he or she may argue that the requirements of the treaty or
those that are applicable under Mexican law have not been satisfied.73 Second,
he may argue that he is not the person sought by U.S. officials. 7
The district judge then makes a decision, and sends it back to the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs.75 At that point, they review the opinion of the district court
judge and other relevant materials.76 The final decision on whether to extradite
61 See BASSIOUNI, supra note 19, at 791-93 (citing a memorandum issued by the Office of
the Legal Advisor, Department of State).
" See Zagaris & Peralta, supra note 61, at 551.
"See U.S. Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 17, at art. 10(3Xa),(b).
6s See id. at art. 10(4).
6See Zagaris & Peralta, supra note 61, at 543.
70 See id. at 544. Two evidentiary prerequisites must be met before a suspect is arrested or
prosecuted. First, "[e]vidence must be sufficient to demonstrate all the elements of the crime
(typification) and the existence of facts showing 'probable responsibility,' the equivalent of
probable cause in United States extradition jurisprudence," and second, that the suspect
committed the crime set forth in the request for extradition. Id.
71 See id.
72 See id.
7' See id. at 545.
7' See Zagaris & Peralta, supra note 61, at 545.
71 See id.
76 See id. at 548.
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rests with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs." In fact, they are not obligated to
follow the judge's recommendation. 8 Also, when dealing with a request for
surrender of a Mexican national, Mexican authorities generally exercise the
broad discretion allocated to them to deny this type of request.
Finally, the requested offender is either surrendered to U.S. authorities79 or
released from custody.80
V. ARGUMENTS AGAINST EXTRADITION OF NATIONALS
The general theory behind refusing to extradite nationals to another state
dates back to medieval times and the relationship between a feudal ruler and
his subjects.8' Under this feudal system, the subjects were given the right not
to be withdrawn from the jurisdiction of local courts, in return for allegiance
and service. By the middle of the nineteenth century, most European nations
had adopted this principle, and it persists today in Europe and Latin America. 3
In the 1970s, absolute exceptions to the extradition of nationals to a
requesting state were commonly included in the majority of international
extradition treaties." Today, most civil law countries still refuse to surrender
their own nationals, while common law nations generally allow their own
nationals to be extradited to other countries. 85
This disparity in practice may stem from the differences in the way the two
legal systems generally view the status of their nationals. In civil law
countries, the citizens are considered compatriots, who deserve the protection
of the laws of their state. 6 On the other hand, in common law countries,
citizens who are accused of committing crimes are viewed as just that:
criminals who deserve to be punished. That is, their status as citizens of the
nation is viewed as secondary to their status as criminals.87 This view was
77 See id.
78 See id.
79 See U.S. Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 17, at art. 14(3).
See Spector, supra note 4, at 1017.
, See Plachta, supra note 4, at 82.
82 See id.
" See id. at 84.
8See I.A. SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, app. 2, at 219-23 (1971).
"5 See BAssIOUNI, supra note 19, at 588; ETHAN A. NADELMANN, Cops ACROSS BORDERS:
THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF U.S. CRIMINAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 430-34 (1993).
" See Plachta, supra note 4, at 94 (citing A.L. Melai, Les conventions Europeennes et le
traite Benelux d'entr 'aide judiciare en matiere penale et d'extradition, in LE DROrr PENAL
INTERNATIONAL 91, 103 (1965)).97 See id.
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expressed in a 1968 declaration by the Chairman of the English House of
Commons: "We don't feel outraged honour at the thought of delivering an
Englishman into the hands of foreign judges. He is first of all a criminal and
only after that an Englishman."
88
However, the refusal to extradite nationals is not only a result of the
different legal systems. Several traditional arguments against the practice of
extraditing nationals have been advanced.
First, countries refusing to extradite nationals often base their reluctance on
their belief that their domestic courts are competent to prosecute and punish
the offenders.89 In other words, they do not contest the culpability of the
offender, but instead believe that there is no reason to submit the offender to
the courts of a foreign nation if justice can be served domestically. Further-
more, according to Mexican law, Mexican courts have jurisdiction over all
crimes committed by Mexican citizens, regardless of where the offense takes
place. 90 This is a major argument advanced by Mexico in justifying their
refusal to surrender Mexican nationals to the U.S. courts.
A second argument is based on fears of the requested state that their
national, if extradited, will be mistreated or will be denied a fair trial in the
requesting state.9' These fears stem from the inherent mistrust a state has for
the justice systems of foreign nations, and from the ethnic or racial biases that
may arise when a national is subjected to the court of another state.92 It is
generally not unreasonable to assume that a foreign defendant may be subject
to discrimination in legal proceedings occurring outside of the defendant's
country of residence. Thus, "[i]fjustice as administered in other States is not
to be trusted, then there should be no extradition at all." 93
Third, opponents of the extradition of nationals point to the fact that "it is
a serious disadvantage for a man to be tried in a foreign language, and where
he is separated from his friends and his resources and from those who could
bear witness to his previous life and character."'" Thus, the offender may be
denied the support and protection afforded to him by a trial in his own country
in the form of moral and evidentiary support. Also, the defendant would be
s Id.
'9 See Abramschmitt, supra note 7, at 128-29.
90 See id. at 128 (citing MODERN LEGAL SYSTEMS CYCLOPEDIA: THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF
MEXICO § 1.30.52 (1988)).
9' See Plachta, supra note 4, at 87.
92 See id. at 87.
93 Id. (quoting Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Convention on Extradition, 29
AM. J. INT'L L. 15, 296 (Supp. 1935)).
9 Id. at 87.
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further disadvantaged by his unfamiliarity with the criminal procedures of a
foreign nation, and thus would be hindered in his efforts to defend himself
during trial.95
A fourth argument relates to the concept of national dignity. Countries
refusing to extradite their own nationals often justify their refusal based on the
idea that no citizen "should be compelled to bow his head in obedience to the
commands of a foreign authority." 96 Similarly, a country which extradites its
own nationals may be viewed by its own citizens as weak. That is, public
confidence in the government may be eroded by a perception that it is
incapable of properly administering justice within its territory. This argument
is closely related to the notion of national sovereignty. States believe that to
allow another state to enforce its criminal laws extraterritorially would be a
violation of the requested state's national sovereignty.
Finally, although the Extradition Treaty specifically prevents the requesting
state from enforcing the imposition of the death penalty on offenders if the
laws of the requested state prohibit it from doing so, Mexico still fears the
possibility of harsher sentences for Mexican nationals in the United States.97
Mexico believes that their citizens deserve the protection of the laws of
Mexico, including the sentencing laws.9" A state's sentencing laws reflect
what the state considers to be the degree of culpability of an offender. When
another state imposes stricter sentences, it is effectively imputing a higher
degree of culpability on the offender. These arguments against extraditing
nationals form the theoretical basis for Mexico's past refusals to comply with
U.S. extradition requests when the offender is a Mexican national.
VI. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF EXTRADITING NATIONALS
The main argument in favor of extraditing nationals is based on the belief
that a person residing or conducting business in another country owes
obedience to the laws of that country." This view was expressed by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Justice Harlan's majority opinion in Neely v. Henkel."
95 See NADELMANN, supra note 85, at 427.
96 Plachta, supra note 4, at 93.
9 See, e.g., U.S. Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 17, at art. 8.
98 See Robert T. Caldwell,ExtraditingAlleged DrugKingpin Would Be Historic, SAN DIEGO
UNION TRIB., Apr. 8, 2001, at G4.
99 See Plachta, supra note 4, at 86-87 (citing Royal Commission on Extradition, Report of
the Commissioners, 1878, C. 2039, at 6 (Gr. Brit.)).
'0o See Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 123 (1900).
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When an American citizen commits a crime in a foreign
country, he cannot complain if required to submit to such
modes of trial and to such modes of punishment as the laws
of that country may prescribe for its own people, unless a
different mode be provided for by treaty stipulations between
that country and the United States.'0 '
Another argument, primarily advanced in the context of extradition of
narcotics traffickers from Mexico to the United States, is that the courts of
Mexico are often incompetent to prosecute the offender domestically. 2
Narco-traffickers wield enormous amounts of influence in the Mexican
judicial institutions in the form of bribery and threats to the lives of those who
attempt to interfere with their business.0 3 Thus, domestic prosecution of drug
traffickers is often not a viable option in Mexico.
As a result of this widespread corruption, many proponents of extradition
of Mexican nationals contend that, "extradition [to the U.S.] is less susceptible
to undue influence than prosecution and incarceration in Mexico, because
there are fewer stages at which undue influence can be asserted."'"' 4 This is so
because two important stages of prosecution that are the most vulnerable to
corruption, the criminal trial and the sentencing and imprisonment, will no
longer be controlled by Mexican judges.0" And since Mexican nationals, as
opposed to non-nationals, are in the best position to exert this influence, their
extradition will prove to be a more effective means of serving justice.
Furthermore, if narcotics traffickers are imprisoned in Mexico, they often
enjoy luxurious living conditions, such as jacuzzis and unlimited access to
prostitutes."° Also, some prisoners are allowed access to personal cellular
telephone service.0" This allows drug lords to continue directing the operation
of their organizations from inside prisons.'0 8 Thus, in the rare case domestic
prosecution is successful, the sentences imposed can hardly be expected to
deter future narcotics traffickers from engaging in the trade.
101 Id.
"0 See Spector, supra note 4, at 1007.
103 See Fineman & Rotella, supra note 13, at Al.
104 Spector, supra note 4, at 1034.
'o See id.
' See Marion Lloyd, Fox Takes on Dealers No Easy Task Mexican Leader Faces Swift
Counterattack, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 22, 2001, at Al.
107 See id.
log See id.
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Another argument advanced by proponents of extradition of nationals is
that the practice would deter cross-border crime."° If a criminal is aware that
he could face prosecution in another country, he will be less likely to commit
the crime. Being tried in another country has many implications, some of
which are addressed in the arguments against the practice of surrendering
nationals to other countries. For example, a person facing trial in another
country will be separated from his friends and family. He will not be afforded
the protections of the laws of his state, and will have to defend himself in a
different language in a legal system with different criminal procedures.
Furthermore, in the U.S.-Mexico context, he will most likely face harsher
sentences. These factors lend support to the argument that the possibility of
facing trial in a foreign country will deter cross-border crime.
A related argument is premised on the concept of reciprocity. The U.S.
believes that it is in the interest of both countries to prosecute a criminal where
he or she has committed the crime, thus deterring future violations of the
law." ' There are numerous United States citizens whom the Mexican
government would like to prosecute."' Thus, by allowing extradition of these
U.S. nationals, the United States hopes to induce Mexican authorities to
surrender Mexican nationals accused of crimes in the United States, thereby
furthering the national interests of both countries.
Finally, some Mexican proponents of extradition argue that surrendering
Mexican criminals to the courts of the United States is not a violation of
sovereignty at all." 2 Rather, the process of extradition involves a complex,
legitimate legal process."' Furthermore, since the Mexican Supreme Court's
approval of the process, extraditing Mexican nationals to stand trial in the
United States is considered constitutional."4 Thus, the practice does not
violate the sovereignty of Mexico, but rather is a tool of cooperation.
As evidenced by the events of the past year, it seems that the Mexican
authorities have been persuaded by at least some of these theoretical
arguments.
o9 See Spector, supra note 4, at 1025.
11o See Caldwell, supra note 5, at GI.
... See id.; see also Zagaris & Peralta, supra note 61, at 593-94.
112 See Mexican Deputy Attorney General Affirms 'Extradition Prevents Impunity', WORLD
NEWS CONNECTION, Apr. 2, 2001 (quoting an interview with Mexican Deputy Attorney General
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VII. RECENT EXTRADITION CASES FROM MEXICO TO THE UNITED STATES
Between 1984 and 1996, the United States submitted a total of 151 requests
for extradition to the Mexican authorities.' ' According to the Mexican
Attorney General, extradition to the United States was granted for thirty-nine
U.S. and third country citizens from 1988 to 1996."" However, it was not until
1996 that any offenders of possible Mexican nationality were extradited."
7
In January 1996, Mexican authorities granted extradition for Juan Garcia
Abrego, who was flown to Houston after already being indicted on charges of
cocaine possession, importation, and distribution, and money laundering."'
Garcia Abrego was considered by U.S. law enforcement agencies as one of the
world's most wanted drug kingpins." 9 Abrego was also linked to high-level
government pay-offs and to the 1994 assassination of Luis Donaldo Colosio,
the PRI's presidential candidate.'20 However, Mexico was still able to uphold
its policy against extraditing Mexican nationals by classifying Abrego as a
foreigner based on his status as a dual citizen of the United States and
Mexico.' Using a provision of the Mexican Constitution, Mexico was
allowed to deport Abrego due to his status as a foreigner, and thereby
circumvent the lengthy extradition process.
2 2
Next, in April 1996, Mexico authorized the extradition of Francisco Gamez
Garcia and Aaron Morel LeBaron." Gamez had already been convicted in
Arizona state court for sexual abuse and sexual misconduct with a minor, and
was on provisional release when he fled to Mexico. 2 Even though Gamez
Garcia was a Mexican national, Mexico was once again able to justify his
extradition on other grounds. Since he had already been convicted in the
United States, Mexico was not able to prosecute him for those crimes because
it would violate the principle of double jeopardy, or non bis in idem. 21 This
"' See Zagaris & Peralta, supra note 61, at 532.
116 See id.
"7 See id. at 611-12; see also Sam Dillon, Mexico Arrests Top Suspect in Drug Trade, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 16, 1996, at Al.
I"S See Dillon, supra note 117, at Al.
119 See id.
20 See Andrew Reding, Narco-Politics in Mexico, NATION, July 10, 1995, at 50, 51.
'2' See Dillon, supra note 117, at Al.
2 See id. at A2.
12 See Zagaris & Peralta, supra note 61, at 611.
"A See id.
115 See id.
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principle of criminal law prevents an offender from being prosecuted for the
same crime twice."
LeBaron was extradited in connection with charges of conspiracy to
commit murder, racketeering, and participation in a corrupt organization
(RICO).1'2 It was alleged that LeBaron was the head of a religious sect that
murders any member who tries to leave the sect. He allegedly ordered the
murders of four members, one of which was an eight year-old girl. 2 '
Although the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs extradited LeBaron in
accordance with the treaty, taking into account the deplorable nature of the
crime, the United States classified him as a U.S. citizen due to the fact that
both his parents were U.S. citizens.'29 This facilitated his extradition by
helping the Mexican authorities based their decision on citizenship, rather than
on "extraordinary" circumstances. 3
Thus, although these cases of extradition seemed promising at the time, in
each case Mexico managed to uphold its longstanding policy against
extraditing Mexican nationals to the United States. It was not until more than
four years later that Mexico authorized the extradition of major Mexican
narcotics traffickers without attempting to justify the extradition on other
grounds.
On November 8, 1997, thirty-three year-old Edverardo Arturo Paez
Martinez (Paez), a principal lieutenant in the Tijuana-based Arellano Felix
Organization, was arrested by Mexican police while dining at a Japanese
restaurant in Tijuana.' Paez was indicted in the United States for conspiring
to distribute more than a ton of cocaine that he arranged to smuggle into the
United States from 1988 to 1996.112 Privately, the U.S. Government claims
that he supervised the smuggling of more than twenty tons of cocaine into the
United States.' The Government of then President Ernest Zedillo was
formally pursuing extradition, but Paez's armada of attorneys have been
resisting, claiming that extradition would violate the Mexican Constitution.'
34
According to a former senior Justice Department official, the Paez case is "the
116 See id. at 611 (noting that this principle is set forth in Article 23 of the Mexican
Constitution, and Article 6 of the extradition treaty).
127 See id. at 612.
i See id.
n See Zagaris & Peralta, supra note 61, at 612.
130 See id.
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centerpiece of the idea of actually having a key drug lord who is purely a
Mexican citizen extradited to the United States."' 35 Paez's extradition case
went before the Mexican Supreme Court, 36 and on January 18,2001, the court,
in a 10-1 ruling, authorized his extradition to the United States, saying that the
Mexican government has discretionary power to extradite nationals to the
United States, provided that they be sentenced in accordance with Mexican
sentencing guidelines. 3 Paez was extradited to the United States in May
2001.g38 This represented a major change in Mexico's extradition policy.
Since the January Mexican Supreme Court ruling, other narcotics
traffickers have been extradited as well. On March 2, 2001, Fernando Farias
was extradited to the United States, where he faced charges for the possession
and distribution of five kilograms of cocaine and marijuana.'39 He was the first
Mexican national extradited since the ruling.
In addition, Miguel Angel Martinez-Martinez and Francisco Rafael
Camarena Macias were extradited on drug charges." Angel Martinez, a
member of the Sinaloa-based Guzman cartel, was responsible for smuggling
tons of narcotics into the United States, and for attempting to build a 1452 foot
tunnel from Tijuana to Otay Mesa in California. "' Macias was responsible for
successfully building a tunnel from Mexico to Arizona, through which flowed
approximately two tons of cocaine per day." 2
Furthermore, on September 20,2001, Mexico extradited two more suspects
to the United States, Isaias Hernandez Garcia, and Juan Hernandez Ibarra." 3
Garcia was wanted for cocaine smuggling in California, while Ibarra was
wanted for heroin distribution in Colorado.'"
135 Id.
136 See id.
7 See Mexico Ready to Extradite Suspects, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 20, 200 1, available at
2001 WL 9868121.
" See Diane Feinstein, Senator Feinstein Urges that the Certification Process with Mexico
be Suspended for Three Years, GOV'T PRESS RELEASES BY FED. DOCUMENT CLEARINGHOUSE,
Sept. 6, 2001.
' See Mexican Deputy Attorney General Affirms 'Extradition Prevents Impunity', supra
note 112.
"4 See Feinstein, supra note 138.
141 See id.
142 See id.
'43 See Mexico Extradites Two Suspected Drug Smugglers, EFE NEWS SERVICES, Sept. 20,
2001.
'44 See id.
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VIII. OBSTACLES AGAINST EXTRADITION OF NATIONALS
Although the theoretical arguments set forth by Mexican opponents of
extradition constitute a major obstacle to increased extradition, several
practical obstacles also exist. These must be addressed in order to fully
reverse the trend against extraditing Mexican nationals accused of trafficking
narcotics to the United States.
A. The 'Exceptional'Problem
The first and most obvious obstacle to increased extradition of Mexican
nationals is the Mexican law permitting extradition of nationals only under
"exceptional" circumstances." The law states, "No Mexican shall be
surrendered to a foreign state, save in cases considered exceptional by the
executive, who may so determine."1 6 This issue is also embodied in the
Article 9 of the Extradition Treaty which indicates that neither country is
obligated to surrender its own nationals to the other country. 47 Although the
Mexican Supreme Court has construed this clause as authorizing, and not
prohibiting, extradition of Mexican nationals at their discretion,' previous
Mexican Executives have been less than cooperative in this area.
Some commentators have expressed the need to amend the wording of the
Mexican law to lower the threshold and allow more discretion to the
Executive. 49 "For example, an amended article 14 could read, 'A Mexican
will be surrendered to a foreign state when the Executive deems
appropriate.' 50 Through the use of this less restrictive language, more
discretion could be afforded to the Mexican Executive in determining when to
extradite a cartel kingpin.
However, the proposals of these commentators are largely moot at this
point because the Mexican Executive has decided to consider the extradition
of Mexican narcotics traffickers "appropriate," and has thus authorized the
extradition of numerous Mexican nationals.
'~ See Spector, supra note 4, at 1028.
146 Id.
'17 See U.S. Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 17, at art. 9.
4 See Plachta, supra note 4, at 143-44.
"' See Spector, supra note 4, at 1035.
15o Id.
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B. Corruption of Mexican Law Enforcement
The second major obstacle to increased extradition of Mexican nationals
is corruption in the Mexican law enforcement agencies. "' While it is certainly
possible that corruption in Mexico may actually increase the chances of
Mexico extraditing its nationals to the United States, due to the ineffectiveness
of domestic prosecution, one must distinguish between the different levels in
which corruption occurs.
Corruption in the judiciary will inevitably lead to more acquittals and
dismissals, and thus, may cause some to cite it as a reason for increased
extradition. However, it is corruption in the anti-narcotics law enforcement
agencies of Mexico that stands as a major impediment to increased extradition
because, in order for the issue of extradition to arise, the alleged offender must
first be arrested and taken into custody by local officials.
However, due to the enormous amounts of influence wielded by the cartel
leaders, this is a very rare occasion. Widespread, endemic corruption plagues
the law enforcement institutions of Mexico. As a result, drug kingpins enjoy
a virtual immunity from arrest or molestation. An estimated $20 billion a year
in drug profits enrich the Mexican cartels and allow them to finance their
campaign of bribery, intimidation, and murder."5 2 The Mexican government
has found it virtually impossible to compete with such high funding.
According to a study done by the Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico
(National Autonomous University of Mexico) (UNAM), the Mexican Federal
Attorney General's annual budget is only $200 million, while the drug cartels
spend as much as $500 million bribing officials." 3 According to estimates by
American officials, the Tijuana-based Arellano Felix Organization (AFO)
spends approximately $1 million each week bribing federal, state, and local
officials.'- Evidently, $17 million was required to bribe Mexico's former top
"' See Plachta, supra note 4, at 129.
152 See Robert J. Caldwell, Drug-Fighting Agenda for Two Presidents, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIB., July 23, 2000, at 2.
'" See Fineman & Rotella, supra note 13, afAl (citing recent study by UNAM).
114 See Donnie Marshall, Acting Deputy Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration,
United States Department of Justice, Prepared Statement Before The House Government Reform
and Oversight Committee Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and
Criminal Justice (Mar. 18, 1998).
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anti-narcotics enforcer Mario Ruiz Massieu in 1995.'55 Massieu eventually
committed suicide on September 25, 1999, in New Jersey.'"
On April 30, 1997, Jorge Madrazo, Mexico's Attorney General dismantled
the Esfuerzo Nacional en el Combate al Narcotrafico (Institute for Combatting
Drugs) (INCD) after it became known that its director, General Gutierrez
Rebollo, and many of its agents were accepting bribes from drug traffickers." 7
The INCD, which was created in 1993, sought to replace other corrupt drug-
fighting organizations.5 8
While large payments are required for high-level drug enforcement
officials, an amount like that paid to Massieu is not necessary in most cases.
The immense resources possessed by drug cartels, coupled with comparatively
meager salaries for lower-level law enforcement officials, make accepting
bribes almost irresistible for Mexican police officers. In 1997, the typical
Mexican police officer earned approximately $300 per month, while the
typical cartel bodyguard earned approximately $2000-$3000 per week.'59
Low-salaried law enforcement officials can hardly resist the temptation of
kickbacks in return for merely turning their heads the other way.
Also, if they refuse the bribe, they or their families will be threatened or
killed. According to a common Mexican saying, "Take the Plata o Plomo,"
which means "take the silver or the lead," Mexican police officers have very
little choice in the matter. 16
Low salaries are not the only factor that encourages corruption in Mexico's
law enforcement institutions. Active drug control strategies, especially those
aimed at curbing drug supply (crop destruction, interdiction, etc.), can also
enhance corruption. 6' First, simple economics dictates that by decreasing the
supply of narcotics in the United States, prices and profits for the cartels
increase. This gives the cartels more resources with which to bribe officials.
Second, the more pressure is exerted on cartels, the more pressure they will be
forced to exert on local officials to maintain their status and business.
,' See Todd Robberson, Mexican Held in U.S. Linked to Drug Cartel: Bribes May Play Role
in Probe of Killing, WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 1995, at Al.
"' See The Week in Review, 22 NAT'L L.J. 5, at A6 (1999).
's' See Sam Dillon, Mexico Shakes Up Anti-Drug Force, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1997, at Al;
Julia Preston, A General in Mexico'sDrug War is Dismissed on Narcotics Charges, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 19, 1997, at Al.
258 See id.
"s See Linda Robinson, An Inferno Next Door, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 24, 1997,
at 36, 38.
160 See NADELMAN, supra note 85, at 258.
,61 See Kal Raustiala, Law, Liberalization & International Narcotics Trafficking, 32 N.Y.U.
J. INT'L &POL. 89, at 101 (1999).
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"Greater effectiveness in drug control leads to greater incentives on the part
of traffickers to invest in the corruption and manipulation of drug control
agents.'
'1 62
Widespread corruption in the Mexican law enforcement community has
also had an adverse effect on cooperative efforts between the Mexican officials
and their U.S. counterparts. 63 Knowledge that many of the Mexican police
officers are accepting bribes breeds mistrust between the officials of both
countries, as it is difficult to differentiate between which officials are honest,
and which ones are secretly working for the cartels. According to one member
of the National Border Control Council, "It's hard for our agents to feel
comfortable working with people on the south side when there's this level of
corruption and distrust.""' Indeed, even Mexico's President Vicente Fox
acknowledges the existence of mistrust in the context of U.S.-Mexican
relations: "Bad blood and distrust ran deep on both sides of the border, making
collaboration on many issues difficult if not impossible.'
' 65
Furthermore, U.S. law enforcement officials often withhold information
from their Mexican counterparts that they fear will be leaked to the cartels by
corrupt Mexican agents or prosecutors.1
C. Abduction of Dr. Humberto Alvarez-Machain
Another major obstacle that has hampered efforts to extradite Mexican
nationals is rooted in the Mexican government's resentment and mistrust of the
U.S. government. 67 Although this climate has existed for decades, its strength
was renewed by the U.S. abduction of Dr. Alvarez-Machain. The need to
curtail the massive amounts of international drug trafficking and the U.S.
government's growing frustration over Mexico's refusal to extradite nationals
prompted the U.S. government to resort to the process of "irregular
rendition."'
' 6
62 Raustiala, supra note 161, at 101.
163 See Vicente Fox, Now Trust is the Basis for Mexico-US. Cooperation, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 5, 2001, at B4.
16 Tony Saavedra, Moves to Stem Corruption Must Go Slow, Experts Say, ORANGE COUNTY
(CAL.) REG., Nov. 29, 2000, available at 2000 WL 29970779.
165 Fox, supra note 1, at B4.
'6 See Mexico, U.S. Must Unite Against Drugs, STATE J.-REG. (Springfield, IL), Feb. 5,
2001, at 4, available at 2001 WL 8872308.
167 See Fox, supra note 1, at B4.
168 See Kosmetatos, supra note 12, at 1066.
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Irregular rendition is "the forceful abduction of an individual from one
country by agents of another country, principally without the knowledge or
consent of the former."" 9 However, rather than alleviating the situation, the
event, and the Supreme Court's subsequent approval of the tactic, caused
outrage in the Mexican government and in the international community. 170 To
opponents of the decision, the abduction undermined a central purpose of the
U.S. Mexican Extradition Treaty-to preclude unilateral abductions in foreign
territory.171
In reaction to the event, the Mexican government temporarily suspended
government cooperation with DEA agents working in Mexico. 72  The
international community was similarly outraged. 73 Governments around the
world condemned the decision as a blatant violation of international law, and
sent formal protests to the U.S. govemment. 74  Other Latin American
governments reacted by refusing to comply with U.S. extradition requests.
75
Upon request from leaders throughout the region, the Inter-American Juridical
Committee of the OAS issued an opinion calling the abduction a serious
violation of international law and "an impermissible transgression of Mexico's
territorial sovereignty.' ' 76 Opponents also warned of retaliations against U.S.
citizens by foreign nations seeking extradition from the Unites States. ' 77 It
seemed that by resorting to irregular rendition, the United States was
effectively condoning the practice as a valid means of bringing foreign
defendants to justice. 78
The abduction of Dr. Alvarez-Machain thus further hindered U.S. efforts
to curb the flow of illegal narcotics into the country. Furthermore, it increased
the level of mistrust that already existed in the relations between the two
"' Melanie M. Laflin, Kidnapped Terrorists: Bringing International Criminals to Justice
Through Irregular Rendition and Other Quasi-Legal Options, 26 J. LEGIS. 315, 315 (2000).
, See Kosmetatos, supra note 12, at 1084-91.
' See id. at 1090.
172 See Tim Golden, After Court Ruling, Mexico Tells US. Agents to Halt Activity, N.Y.
TIMEs, June 16, 1992, at A19.
173 See Kosmetatos, supra note 12, at 1087-88.
'7' See William J. Aceves, The Legality of TransborderAbductions: A study of United States
v. Alvarez-Machain, 3 Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM. 101, at 120.
175 See id.
'76 See Kosmetatos, supra note 12, at 1088 (citing Legal Opinion of the Inter-American
Juridical Committee on the Decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in the Alvarez-Machain Case,
reprinted in 13 HUM. RTS. L. J. 395 (1992)).
'7 See, e.g., Thomas F. Liotti, Alvarez-Machain Was a Vote for Anarchy, NAT'L L.J., Aug.
24, 1992, col. 3; Jonathan Bush, How Did We Get Here? Foreign Abduction After Alvarez-
Machain, 45 STAN. L. REV. 939, 941-44 (1993).
178 See id.
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countries. However, the event also lead to the signing of the Transborder
Abduction Treaty in 1994,' 79 which will be discussed more fully in the
following section.
IX. PROSPECTS FOR INCREASED EXTRADITION OF MEXICAN NATIONALS
Despite the existence of several major practical obstacles, there are also
several prospects for increased extradition of Mexican nationals to the United
States.
A. Recent Mexican Supreme Court Decision
The decision by the Mexican Supreme Court in January 2001 with regards
to extradition to the United States represents a major change in Mexico's
longstanding policy against the extradition of Mexican nationals. According
to U.S. officials, the ruling is seen as a test of Mexico's willingness to
cooperate in the war on drugs. 80 The ruling also adds judicial legitimacy to
the theory that extradition is essential to the battle against the cartels of
Mexico. The ruling constitutes a major breakthrough in U.S.-Mexican
extradition relations.
B. Difficulties in Stemming Institutional Corruption
On July 2, 2000, Vicente Fox was elected as the new president of Mexico,
ending over seventy years of dominance by the PRI. 8' One of Fox's main
campaign promises was to crack down on corruption in Mexico's police
forces, and he has already outlined a bold anti-drug agenda. 2 Just three days
after his victory, he vowed to reorganize federal law enforcement and attack
police corruption in Mexico." 3
However, Fox's chances of achieving such a lofty goal are slim considering
past failed attempts to curtail corruption. 14 According to DEA administrator
'7 See Laflin, supra note 169, at 330.
180 See Ellingwood, supra note 16, at A3.
181 See Caldwell, supra note 152, at GI. The PRI, while promoting stability in Mexico
through their dominance of the nation's institutions, was often seen as being in collusion with
the cartels. See Joel Estudillo Rendon, Drugs, Sexenios, and Rocky Roads, Bus. MEX., Vol. II,
Issue 3, Mar. 1, 2001, available at 2001 WL 7670889.
882 See Caldwell, supra note 152, at G1.
183 See id.
' See generally Saavedra, supra note 164.
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Donnie Marshall, who met with Fox briefly after his election, Fox faces an
"uphill battle."' 85 Marshall said he was "not happy with the results we have
seen out of Mexico." ' "They have not been able to really dismantle any of
the major drug trafficking organizations on their own."'87
Since taking office, Fox has had some successes in attempting to battle
corruption and arrest traffickers. In April 2001, Mexican authorities arrested
Gilberto Garcia and nineteen of his subordinates. 88 "The arrest mark[ed]
Mexico's new administration's first major success in apprehending a purported
high-ranking drug lord."'89
But this success has been limited. A major blow to Fox's attempts to curb
corruption came in January 2001, when one of the country's most notorious
narcotics traffickers, Joaquin Guzman, escaped from a maximum security
prison in Guadalajara.'90 The Mexican Attorney General has charged seventy-
three prison officials and guards with aiding the drug lord's escape."9
The obstacles faced by previous executives, will surely surface in Fox's
fight against corruption in Mexico's police force. Furthermore, making
progress in this area, while not totally impossible, will take time. "Things are
not going to be transformed overnight," said Tom Umberg, a former deputy
U.S. drug czar, "It's only possible if (Fox) recognizes it's a long-term project
that will require a generation to transform."' 92
Proponents of increased extradition hope that Fox's bold and apparently
sincere stance on curbing narcotics trafficking, coupled with his recognition
that ending corruption in Mexico will take a long time, may lead to increased
extradition. That is, Fox may realize that for the time being, domestic
prosecution is not a viable option, and that in order to attack the rampant drug
trafficking problem in Mexico, he must ensure that narco-traffickers receive
strict prison sentences. This can only be accomplished by extraditing
offenders to the United States. Proponents point to Fox's recent extradition
requests as signs of his recognition of this fact.
85 See Gregory A. Gross, All Eyes on Fox, DEA official says-Next Mexican Chiefs Drug
Stance A waited, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRiB., Nov. 15, 2000, at A 13.
196 Id.
187 Id.
1" See Mexico Arrests Suspected Drug Lord, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 10, 2001, available
at 2001 WL 18926413.
159 Id.
'90 See Michael Riley, Mexico Drug Seizures Climb/Traffickers Being Extradited to US. for
Trial, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Mar. 16, 2001, available at 2001 WL 3006368.
191 See id.
192 Saavedra, supra note 164.
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Furthermore, in order to maintain the strength of his political base, he must
follow through on his campaign promises. According to Marshall, extradition
"would send a message [to drug cartels] that they are no longer immune to
arrest and prosecution in Mexico."' 93
C. UN. and World Support for Extradition of Nationals
Another major prospect comes in the form of U.N. and world support for
the abolition of the practice of refusing extradition based on the nationality of
the offender.'
In 1992, Libya refused extradition of two nationals suspected of involve-
ment in the planting of a bomb which exploded aboard a Pan Am flight 103
over Lockerbie, Scotland, killing 270 civilians. 95 In response, the U.N.
Security Council adopted Resolutions 731 and 748, which urged Libya to
respond to the requests of the United States, United Kingdom and France to
extradite the suspects for prosecution before a Scottish court in the Nether-
lands.' The Resolution also imposed sanctions on Libya for their failure to
cooperate with earlier requests. 197
In response to these Resolutions, Libya went to the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) seeking to prevent the United States and the United Kingdom
from compelling it to surrender the alleged offenders.'98 However, to the
dismay of Libyan officials, the court confirmed the validity of the
Resolutions.'" With the assistance of statesman Nelson Mandela, Libya
eventually surrendered the suspects for prosecution in the Netherlands.2"°
However, one must realize that the crimes of aircraft piracy, and interna-
tional terrorism in general have long been accorded the status of universal
'9' Gross, supra note 185, at A13.
'9 See Laflin, supra note 169, at 334.
'95 See Robert Holloway, U.N. Releases Letter to Kadhafi over Lockerbie Trial, Families
Skeptical, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Aug. 25, 2000, available at 2000 WL 24697152; see also
Laflin, supra note 169, at 333.
'9 See Sec. S.C. Res. 731, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3033d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/23574 (1992),
reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 731 (1992); S.C. Res. 748, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3063d mtg., U.N.
Doc. S/RES/748 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 749 (1992); Holloway, supra note 195.
'9 See S.C. Res. 748, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3063d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/748 (1992),
reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 749 (1992).
" See BASSIOUNI, supra note 19, at 365.
19 See id.
200 See Allen Nacheman Tripoli distances itself from Lockerbie verdict as Libyan convicted
AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Jan. 31, 2001, available at 2001 WL 2333754.
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crimes.2' A universal crime is one that has been "recognized by the
community of nations as of universal concern, such as piracy, slave trade,
attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain
acts of terrorism. ' 20 2 But, controversy still exists as to whether the crime of
narcotics trafficking has been accorded that status yet.2°a This could indicate
that the Security Council's forceful actions in this situation were prompted by
the universal nature of the crime, rather than their intent to abolish the practice
of refusing extradition based on the nationality of the offender.2"
But, since the resolutions involving Libya, the United Nations has
continued to support the abolition of non-extradition of nationals in the
criminal context. In 1997, the U.N. Commission on Crime Prevention and
Criminal Justice adopted a proposal in which it was agreed that in the long
term, members should not base refusals to extradite on the nationality of the
alleged offender.20 5
The United Nations has also specifically addressed the extradition of
narcotics traffickers in numerous multilateral conventions on narcotics, and
has imposed a duty to extradite in these instances. 2" However, these
conventions specifically allow nations to refuse to extradite persons accused
of narcotics trafficking if extradition would be contrary to the laws of the
requested states. 207 Thus, prior to the January 2001 decision of the Mexican
Supreme Court, Mexico could plausibly refuse to extradite Mexican narcotics
traffickers, and still be in compliance with the Convention. But now, these
conventions have imposed a duty upon Mexico to extradite Mexican narcotics
traffickers to the United States, as they can no longer rely on the prohibition
contained in Mexican law. However, some opponents of extradition may
,01 See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States §§ 404 (1987).
202 United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1091 (1991); see also BASSIOUNI, supra note 19,
at 568-72 (providing a more comprehensive list of international or universal crimes).
203 But see BASSIOUNI, supra note 19, at 570-71.
204 See Laflin, supra note 169, at 334 (theorizing that the U.N. was merely "supplementing
the system with the recourse to intervene in exceptional situations, especially when the
traditional treaty model proves unworkable.") Id.
205 See U.N. Doc. E/CN. 15/1 997/L/1 6/Rev. 1, at 6.
206 See, e.g., Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Mar. 30, 1961, 18 U.S.T. 1407
[hereinafter Single Convention]; United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Dec. 20 1988, U.N. Doc. E/Conf82/15 Corr. I and Corr.
2, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 493 (1989) [hereinafter U.N. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in
Narcotic Drugs].
207 See Single Convention, supra note 206, at art. 6(5) (stating "Extradition shall be subject
to the conditions provided for by the laws of the requested Party or by applicable extradition
treaties including grounds upon which the requested Party may refuse extradition."); U.N.
Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs, supra note 206, at art. 36(2)(a)(iv).
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argue that they still may be able to rely on Article 9 of the U.S. Mexico
Extradition Treaty, but this provision only gives discretion to the Executive,
not to the Judiciary. Due to the fact that the Executive has since deemed
requests by the United States to extradite "exceptional circumstances," it is
unlikely that Mexico could rely on Article 9 in the future.
To some, the U.N.'s actions regarding narcotics trafficking demonstrate the
world's recognition of the need to extradite nationals in the interests of
justice." 8 This shift in global attitude may serve as an impetus for increased
extradition of Mexican nationals in the fight against narcotics trafficking.
D. Corruption in the Judiciary Signals the Need to Extradite
Corruption in the judiciary is a problem that has plagued the governments
of Latin America for years, Mexico in particular.2" It has had the effect of
solidifying the virtual immunity from prosecution and incarceration enjoyed
by Mexican drug kingpins. It also has created a disincentive to foreign
investment, as an effective judiciary is key to a stable investment climate."'
Potential investors need assurance that their assets will be afforded the
protection of the law."'
As a result, Latin American governments, with the aid of foreign govern-
ments, have initiated numerous judicial reforms. In fact, "a judicial reform
project is underway, has been recently completed, or is currently in the
planning stages in nearly every Latin American country."2"2 For example, in
Mexico, former President Ernest Zedillo implemented numerous judicial
reform measures upon entering office designed to combat corruption and
increase efficiency." 3
However, according to many Latin American authors and Human Rights
watchdogs, these programs have been less than successful, and now many
wonder where the millions of dollars in foreign aid have gone." 4 A major
reason for the failed efforts at judicial reform stems from the judiciary's
S See Laflin, supra note 169, at 334-35.
o See Nagle, infra note 212, at 360-6 1.
20 See id. at 355 (discussing Peruvian President Fujimori's recognition of the need for reform
of the judicial infrastructure to attract foreign investment to the government sector).
211 See id.
212 Luz Estella Nagle, The Cinderella of Government: Judicial Reform in Latin America, 30
CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 345, 346-47 (2000).
13 See id. at 356.
214 See id. at 346.
GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.
inherent desire to preserve the status quo.215 The judiciary in Latin America
has long been "perceived to be benefiting from the status quo and therefore
unwilling to consider reform ... those who control the judiciary enjoy a
monopoly on the judicial system, they have no incentive to promote reform or
act efficiently.,
216
This inability to remedy the inherent flaws of the judiciary may demon-
strate to Mexican officials the need to extradite Mexican nationals accused of
trafficking narcotics. This would effectively eliminate the opportunity for
narco-traffickers to bribe judges and otherjudicial officials. Hence, criminals
would be ensured lengthy prison sentences, which in turn, could act as a
deterrent to narcotics trafficking.
Furthermore, the results of judicial reform will not occur overnight.
Therefore, for the time being, Mexico will have to begin extraditing its own
nationals if they want to curb narcotics trafficking and the societal evils that
accompany it. Even if efforts to curb corruption in the judiciary prove to be
successful, the ruthless and violent nature of the drug cartels ensures that
judges and their families may still be intimidated into dismissing or acquitting.
Thus, for now, extradition is paramount. It will effectively curb the power
and influence wielded by the cartel kingpins. As a result, it is possible that
kingpins will have fewer resources with which to bribe and intimidate judicial
officials.
E. Transborder Abduction Treaty
In the aftermath of the Alvarez-Machain incident, levels of distrust were
high on both sides of the border.21 7 In an effort to ease tensions and increase
cooperation between the two nations, the Unites States and Mexico signed the
Transborder Abduction Treaty in 1994.2IS "In return for an end to state-
sponsored abductions, the U.S. government asked that Mexican officials
consider extraditing their citizens to the U.S. upon request., 2 9 Although this
could have signified the start of a new trend towards increased extradition, the
treaty failed to specifically address the issue of extradition of nationals, which
gave Mexico no incentive to extradite.220
2.. See id. at 354.
216 Maria Dakolias, A Strategy ofJudicial Reform: The Experience in Latin America, 36 VA.
J. INT'L L. 167, 170 (1995).
217 See Fox, supra note 1, at B4.
233 See Laflin, supra note 169, at 330.
219 Id.
220 See Laflin, supra note 169, at 330 (citing Kosmetatos, supra note 116, at 1104).
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Still, some commentators believe that with improved relations could come
the possibility of renegotiation of the Treaty to "require extradition where all
of the applicable grounds and procedures under the agreement apply in the
particular circumstance."22' For example, Article 3 of the proposed U.S.-
Bolivia Extradition Treaty authorizes and requires the extradition of certain
Bolivian nationals for certain serious offenses which are specifically listed,
while affording discretion to the Bolivian Executive in cases involving more
minor crimes. 222 Drug trafficking is included in the list of serious offenses
warranting extradition of a Bolivian national.2 a
This sort of provision is absolutely necessary to increase extradition of
Mexican narco-traffickers to the United States. It would preclude Mexican
authorities from relying on the specific language of the Treaty when refusing
extradition requests. Furthermore, an amendment to the treaty would send a
signal to narco-traffickers that they can no longer evade prosecution.
F. Elimination of Certification
In order to induce Mexico to adopt a more aggressive policy towards
narcotics trafficking, the U.S. president, pursuant to Section 490(b) of the
Foreign Assistance Act, must certify that Mexico has cooperated with the U.S.
government or has taken adequate measures on its own to combat drug
trafficking.224 Mexico has always passed the U.S. certification tests and thus,
has avoided unilateral trade sanctions.225 However, Mexico has always viewed
the process as humiliating and unfair, and this has contributed to the feelings
of resentment held by Mexican officials towards the U.S. 226 As a result,
Senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson, a Texas Republican who has been among the
toughest critics of Mexico's drug policy, introduced a bill in early February
2001 which would exempt Mexico from the annual certification process.2 27 "I
think the healthiest way to start a new relationship is to not have a March 1st
221 Id. at 330.
222 See Extradition Treaty, Jun. 27, 1995, U.S.-Bol. Art. III, S. Treaty Doc. No. 104-22
(1995) [hereinafter U.S. Bolivia Extradition Treaty]; Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance
Treaties: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. On Foreign Aff., 104th Cong. 2-3 (1996) (Statement
of Mark M. Richard, Dep. Ass't Attorney General, U.S. Dept. of Justice).
22 See U.S. Bolivia Extradition Treaty, supra note 222, at an. III.
224 See Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C. 2291 (1994 & Supp. 1997).
" See Ricardo Sandoval, Fox Drug Crackdown Gets Early Praise: Mexican Leader Faces
Long, Hard Fight, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 9, 2001, at IA.
226 See id.
227 See id.
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test of Mexico where we have the Mexico-bashing that we have seen over the
past few years," Hutchinson told reporters.22 Furthermore, Senator Diane
Feinstein (D-Calif) also supported the suspension of the certification process
for three years beginning in 2001.229 Citing the recent extraditions of major
narcotics traffickers, as well as Fox's successes in battling corruption in
Mexican law enforcement, Feinstein concluded that, "the clear signs of
progress made by President Fox, and the new spirit of cooperation between our
two nations, merit such a suspension."'23 This willingness to put an end to
certification clearly signifies a change in the attitudes of both countries, and
indicates an increased willingness to cooperate on the matter.
G. Support from Other Countries
Other nations plagued with narcotics problems seem willing to extradite
their own nationals in order to combat the major societal evils that accompany
the traffic of narcotics. For example, Columbia recently handed over Fabio
Ochoa, a major Columbian drug lord, who was accused of supplying American
users with $5 billion worth of cocaine.23" ' This step may encourage Mexico to
increase extradition, and may demonstrate the fact that other nations have been
able to set aside longstanding apprehensions against extradition. According
to William Walker of Florida International University at Miami, "It's a symbol
of their willingness to limit sovereignty in pursuit of more important goals. 232
H. Increased Trust Among US. and Mexican Law Enforcement
Mistrust on both sides of the border of the two nations' law enforcement
agencies has, in the past, constituted a major obstacle to cooperation in the
fight against narcotics trafficking.233 In an attempt to dispel this climate of
mistrust, President Vicente Fox recently authorized increased access to U.S.
law enforcement agencies to perform security checks on their Mexican
counterparts.23 This move stems from the recognition that U.S. officials need
to trust Mexican authorities in order to cooperate more fully on the apprehen-
sion and eventual extradition of Mexican narcotics traffickers.
22 Id.
9 See Feinstein, supra note 138.
230 Id.
,"1 See Axtman, infra note 238.
232 Id.
233 See Fox, supra note 1, at B4.
234 See Fox Sees US. Role in Vetting Official's, WASHINGTON POST, Apr. 11, 2001, at Al.
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Indeed recent attempts at rebuilding this trust have proven to be rather
successful. For example, U.S. and Mexican authorities collaborated on a raid
in Mexico in June 200 1.235 In a break from past practice, U.S. officials shared
critical information with their Mexican counterparts without any leakage by
the Mexicans to the targets of the raid. 6 According to Fox, this signified new
progress in Mexican attempts to stem corruption in their law enforcement
agencies, and thus to increase cooperation with their northern neighbors.3
X. EFFECTS OF INCREASED EXTRADITION
A. Continued Narcotics Trafficking
Some commentators have noted that the focus of extradition on individual
narco-traffickers has produced some negative effects.2 38 For example, the
United States and Columbia attacks on the Cali and Medellin cartels have
caused the emergence of smaller narcotics trafficking organizations, "making
the players harder to pinpoint and the activity harder to monitor.
239
It is also important to note that while extradition may make the narco-
traffickers more nervous, it will not halt the flow of narcotics into this country.
This is, in part, due to the fact that lower level players in the major organiza-
tions, "usually step into the place of the jailed leaders and reorganize the
operation."2'0 To facilitate this replacement process, the major Mexican
cartels developed a new structure three years ago, which divides territories into
cells, and allows each cartel to assist other cartels in their operations.24
According to the head of Mexico's drug enforcement agency, this new
structure "makes it more difficult to weaken a cartel through the arrest of a key
leader., 21
2
See Fox, supra note 1, at B4.
2 See id.
27 See id.
238 See Kris Axtman, For U.S., A Stronger Hand in Extraditing Drug Lords, CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR, Sept. 25, 2001 (pg. unavail.).
239 1d.
24 See id.
24' See Three More Army Officers Arrested on Drug-Related Charges, SOURCEMEX ECON.
NEWS & ANALYSIS ON MEXICO, Apr. 18, 2001, available at 2001 WL 10229516.
242 Id.
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B. Instability in Mexico
The recent extraditions ofMexican narcotics traffickers from Mexico to the
United States have caused a major backlash in many segments of society, and
threaten stability in the nation as a whole. This backlash has come in the form
of recent unsettling events. These include the assassinations of two top prison
officials, the escape ofJoaquin Guzman, and a surge of violence in areas under
the traffickers' control.243
Under the PRI, the existence of institutional corruption and control of the
country's officials by the cartels presented a major problem, but it never really
put the nation's stability or the regime's institutions at risk. 2" The criminal
organizations were given room to operate, and the complicity with the PRI
helped maintain a certain degree of control over the situation.245
However, now, "with the arrival of a new political group in the executive
Branch... the web of complicity between authorities and drug cartels is now
at risk of being uncovered and dismantled., 246 This may help explain the
recent acts of retaliation by the cartels, and demonstrate one of the effects of
increased extradition of Mexican nationals.
As a result, the cartels have stepped up their campaign of intimidation
against civilians and officials alike. For example, the attorney who repre-
sented Paez for three years in opposing his extradition, was murdered after
eventually failing. 247 Also, cartels have recently put out a $200,000 bounty on
the heads of U.S. agents.248
This problem is exacerbated when one considers the potential effects of
decreasing the supply of narcotics to the United States. As noted before, this
results in an increase in prices in the United States, thus making it more
profitable for the traffickers to do business. This provides the cartels with
more resources with which to bribe, intimidate and murder.
XI. CONCLUSION
By examining all the prospects for and obstacles against increased
extradition of Mexican nationals, itis clear that despite the existence of several
major obstacles, a new trend in the direction of increased cooperation is on the
243 See Lloyd, supra note 106.
24 See Rendon, supra note 181.
245 See id.
246 Id.
247 See Feinstein, supra note 138.
248 See Saavedra, supra note 164.
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horizon. However, many proponents of the practice of denying extradition
based on nationality must be persuaded to discard the deep-seeded ideological
and theoretical justifications which have hampered efforts at curbing the flow
of narcotics to the U.S. thus far.
While efforts at curbing corruption will definitely take a long time to
exhibit results, in the meantime, Mexico's only chance of effectively
combating drug trafficking lies in extradition to the United States. The recent
Mexican Supreme Court ruling may reflect the judiciary's realization of this
fact. But more change is needed.
For example, while judicial recognition of the constitutionality of
extradition is certainly helpful, an amendment to the U.S.-Mexico Extradition
Treaty would be ideal. An amendment of Article 9, which pertains to
extradition of nationals, would represent a major breakthrough for the two
nations, and would have the effect of codifying the new trend towards
extradition.
Also, an elimination of the controversial certification process would set the
stage for increased cooperation between the two nations. More importantly,
it would ease the levels of tension and mistrust that have characterized
relations between the law enforcement agencies of both countries. This is
essential to increased cooperation, and with time, it would lead to a greater
control over the narcotics trafficking industry.
At the same time, some commentators have suggested that the United
States take active legislative measures to make narcotics trafficking less
lucrative for the cartels, i.e., decriminalize and regulate the production and
importation of certain narcotics.249 This would not only lessen the profits of
narcotics traffickers, but would also decrease their need to circumvent the law,
and hence reduce corruption. 5"
The adoption of these measures will contribute greatly to the fight against
narcotics trafficking along the southern border of the United States.
Therefore, despite the recent signs of increased cooperation on this matter,
the existence of several practical and theoretical obstacles stand in the way of
making the extradition of Mexican narcotics traffickers a common practice.
249 See Carlos Fuentes, A New Agenda for Mexico and the US., WASH. TIMES (D.C.), Feb.
14, 2001, at A15.
250 See id.

